



**POLS1001
MODERN CLASSICS IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

Lecturer:	Dr. Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen (l.poulsen@ucl.ac.uk) Dr. Harry Bauer (h.bauer@ucl.ac.uk)
Office Hours:	See SPPBOOK on Moodle (enrolment key: sppbook); or by appointment
Teaching:	10 hours of lectures, 10 hours of seminars
Credits:	0.5 Course Units/ 4 US Credits/ 7.5 ECTS Credits
Assessment: Essay Deadlines:	One book review (40%) and one two-hour exam (60%) 24 April 2017, at 2pm
Attendance:	attendance is compulsory at all lectures and seminars for which students are timetabled. Attendance will be monitored and no student will be entered for assessment unless they have attended and pursued the module to the satisfaction of the department.

USEFUL LINKS

Lecture and Seminar Times:
Online Timetable at www.ucl.ac.uk/timetable

Extenuating Circumstances
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/ug/assessment/extenuating-circumstances>

Penalties for Late Submission and Overlength Essays
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/ug/assessment/essays>

Essay Submission Information
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/ug/assessment/essays>

Essay Writing, Plagiarism and TurnItIn
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/ug/assessment/essays>
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/current-students/guidelines/plagiarism>
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Library/CitationPlagiarism.doc>

Exams
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/current-students/exams_and_awards/regulations/candidate_guide.pdf

Course Description

Practically all debates in political science have their roots in one or more 'classical' works in the discipline. This means that in order to understand and engage with 'cutting edge' scholarship, students need a familiarity with the canon of the discipline.

No course will be able to introduce students to a significant fraction of the major contributions of political analysis, but as a first step this course will make students engage with a number of modern classics. Seven books have been chosen from different sub-fields and cover different approaches to social science. Classes will be spent reflecting on core concepts, theories, and analytical strategies in the readings as well as their policy implications for current political problems.

Organization of Teaching

The course is taught through 2 x 50 minutes combinations of lectures, student presentations, and classroom debates. Attendance at all sessions is required. The lectures and student presentations will introduce broad theories and concepts, providing historical overviews of each week's topic. Students will be expected to demonstrate an understanding of the relevant theories and concepts from the readings, apply these theories to particular policy domains, and to identify the potential shortcomings in the literature. Each student is expected to contribute to all sessions.

Readings

All books are available electronically through UCL's library. For each book we will later in the year offer a limited number of articles to provide the intellectual context. While not required readings, they are useful to understand the significance, and limitations, of the works we discuss.

Assessment

Assessment is based on one book-review written as a 2,000 word essay, and a two-hour exam. The essay counts for 40% and the exam for 60% of the student's mark.

The book review will should provide a critical review of one of the books covered in the first half of the course. Students will be provided with examples of academic book reviews as inspiration. The reviews are expected to cover a number of questions: (i) what are the main themes and argument of the book?; (ii) what are the main strengths and weaknesses of the book?; and (iii) why is the book regarded as a classical contribution to political analysis? Essays that exceed the word limit will be penalised, so students are advised to structure their argument carefully.

Reviews must be handed into reception by 2:00pm on **24 April 2017**. Students must submit two hard copies, and one electronic. For precise submission guidelines visit the SPP website at www.ucl.ac.uk/spp. While students may choose their preferred style for referencing, styles must be consistent within the essay and all references must be appropriately cited. Essays must also be double spaced, have page numbers, and include a cover page with the following information: course title, essay title, essay number and submission date. To ensure essays are marked anonymously, students should omit their names from their essays.

The exam will be held at UCL. Students will be notified by email when their individual timetables for the main examination period are available to view via Portico. As exams are anonymous, students must use their student numbers as identification on the sheets. Further regulations, including what is permitted in the exam hall, can be found here: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/current-students/exams_and_awards/regulations/candidate_guide.pdf.

A note on plagiarism. Cheating and plagiarism are unacceptable. Students caught committing either of these breaches of conduct will be subject to the disciplinary procedures detailed in the University Handbook. Students should consult the Handbook for a comprehensive description of academic dishonesty. Students with any questions should seek clarification prior to submission of work.

Course Outline and Reading List

Weeks 1-2: Democracy and social capital

Putnam, Robert. 1994. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Readings for week I: ch. 1-3.

Questions:

What is Putnam interested in? Why does he choose Italy as object of research? How would a simplifying graph depicting his research design look like (outlining independent and dependent variables as well as potential intervening factors)?

- b. What is the impact of the new political institutions in Italy on the quality of politics?
- c. What methods does Putnam employ and why?

Readings for week II: ch. 4-6.

Questions:

- a. What explains differences in the institutional performance of regional governments in Italy?
- b. What key elements of 'civic life' does Putnam identify? What makes a civic tradition robust?
- c. What arguments link 'civic life', 'social capital' and institutional success?

Additional readings

Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller. 1998. 'Social Capital and Politics'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1(1): 47-73.

Koelble, Thomas. 2003. 'Ten years after: Robert Putnam and making democracy work in the post-colony or why mainstream political science cannot understand either democracy or culture'. *Politikon* 30(1): 203-18.

Levi, Margaret. 1996. 'Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work'. *Politics & Society* 24(1): 45-55.

O'Neill, Claire M. 1996. 'Making Democracy Work: Putnam and his Critics'. *South European Society and Politics* 1(2): 307-18.

Putnam, Robert D. 1995. 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital'. *Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 65-78.

Weeks 3-4: States and revolutions

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Readings for week III: ch. 1-3.

Questions:

- a. How would a simplifying graph of Skocpol basic argument look like (including dependent and independent variables as well as intervening factors and relevant control variables)?
- b. What are the key methodological considerations Skocpol presents? Do they convince?
- c. How can simplifying graphs depict the causes of Skocpol's three cases of social revolutions? What are the similarities and differences between these three cases?

Readings for week IV: ch. 4-conclusion.

Questions:

- a. What are the key differences and similarities when looking at the outcomes of the analysed social revolutions?
- b. What role do ideologies and the international play in Skocpol's account?
- c. Skocpol's approach is often characterized as state-centric. Find arguments for and against this view. Do you find this characterization convincing? Why does it matter?

Additional readings

Burawoy, Michael. 1989. 'Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol versus Trotsky'. *Theory and Society* 18(6): 759-805.

Halliday, Fred. 1990. "The sixth great power": on the study of revolution and international relations'. *Review of International Studies* 16(3): 207-21.

Himmelstein, Jerome L., and Michael S. Kimmel. 1981. States and Revolutions: The Implications and Limits of Skocpol's Structural Model. *American Journal of Sociology* 86 (5): 1145-54.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1991. 'Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases'. *Social Forces* 70(2): 307-20.

Sewell, William H. 1985. 'Ideologies and social revolutions: Reflections on the French case'. *The Journal of Modern History* 57(1): 57-85.

Weeks 5-6: Collective action and public goods

Ostrom, Elinor. 2015. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Readings for week V: ch. 1-3.

Questions:

- a. What is Ostrom interested in? How do the three models of commons compare? How can the issue of the commons be solved? How do suggested solutions compare?
- b. What is a CPR? What issues has the self-organisation of CPR to address? What kind of institutionalism does Ostrom follow?
- c. How does Ostrom select her empirical cases? What makes long-enduring self-organised commons governance possible? Can you identify sufficient and necessary conditions?

Readings for week VI: ch. 4-6.

Questions:

- a. Why are Ostrom's cases useful to understand institutional change and failures?
- b. How is Ostrom's work inter-disciplinary?

Additional readings

Grant, Wyn. 2012. 'Elinor Ostrom's work on Governing The Commons: An Appreciation'. Available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2012/06/17/elinor-ostroms-work-on-governing-the-commons-an-appreciation> (accessed 19 July 2016).

Ostrom, Elinor, Walker, James and Gardner, Roy. 1992. 'Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-governance Is Possible.' *American Political Science Review*, 86(02): 404-417.

Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. 'Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.' *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 137-158

Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. 'Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems'. *American Economic Review* 100(3): 641-72.

Shami, Mahvish. 2012. 'Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity.' *American Political Science Review* 106(03): 588-606.

Week 7: Political behaviour

Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Readings: whole book except ch. 6 and annexes.

Questions:

- a. Which organizations operate almost solely through exit, and which operate almost solely through voice? Which organizations tend to operate based on both?
- b. What is meant in Chapter 3 by “The presence of the exit alternative can ... *atrophy the development of the art of voice.*”? Why is voice an ‘art’?
- c. How can we test Hirschman’s arguments with empirical data?

Additional readings

Lowenstein, Roger. 2013. “The Choice: The Squawk or to Go?” *Wall Street Journal*, March 22nd.

Dowding, Keith, Peter John, Thanos Mergoupis, and Mark van Vugt. 2003. “Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytical and empirical developments,” *European J. of Political Research* 37(4): 469-495.

Dowding, Keith and Peter John. 2015. *Exit, Voices and Social Investment: Citizens’ Reaction to Public Services*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chs. 3-5.

Hirschmann, Albert. 1993. “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History.” *World Politics* 45(2): 173-202.

Barry, Brian. 1974. “Review: ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.’” *British J. Pol. Sci.* 4(1): 79-107 (begin on 82).

Rusbult, Caryl, Isabella Zembrodt, and Lawanna Gunn. 1982. "Exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: Responses to dissatisfaction in romantic involvements." *J. of Personality and Social Psych.* 43(6): 1230-1242.

Week 8: Rationalist bargaining

Schelling, Thomas. 2008. *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Readings: ch. 1-4 and Afterword.

Questions:

- a. (Why) is it useful to stick with an assumption of perfect rationality in international relations?
- b. How can states make focal points?
- d. How can we test Schelling's arguments with empirical data?

Additional readings

Putnam, Robert. 1988. 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.' *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.

Schelling, Thomas. 1956. 'An Essay on Bargaining.' *The American Economic Review* 46(3): 281-306.

Schelling, Thomas. 1957. 'Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War.' *Conflict Resolution* 1(1):19-36.

Schelling, Thomas. 1980. *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Week 9: Political psychology

Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Readings: ch. 1, 2, 6, 10, and 11.

Questions:

- a. What is bounded rationality? How do we measure it?
- b. What does prospect theory tell us about political behaviour?
- c. Can micro-level evidence on the behaviour of individuals be applied to the behaviour of states?

Additional readings

Conlisk, John. 1996. 'Why bounded rationality?' *Journal of economic literature*, 34(2):669-700.

Goldgeier, James M., and Philip E. Tetlock. 2001. 'Psychology and international relations theory'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4(1): 67-92.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. 'Cooperation under the security dilemma.' *World Politics* 30(2):167-214.

Jervis, Robert. 1992. 'Political implications of loss aversion.' *Political Psychology* 13(2): 187-204.

Quattrone, George and Tversky, Amos. 1988. 'Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice.' *The American Political Science Review* 82(3): 719-736.

Week 10: Norms in politics

Finnemore, Martha. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Readings: whole book (incl. annex) except chapter 4.

Questions:

- a. How would a simplifying graph of Finnemore's basic argument look like (including dependent and independent variables as well as intervening factors and relevant control variables?)
- b. What methods to Finnemore use? What other methods could be used to test her theory, and how?
- c. How does Finnemore measure state power?

Additional readings

Dessler, David, and John Owen. 2005. 'Constructivism and the problem of explanation: A review article'. *Perspectives on Politics* 3(3): 597-610.

Farrell, Henry and Finnemore, Martha. 2009. 'Ontology, methodology, and causation in the American school of international political economy.' *Review of International Political Economy* 16(1): 58-71.

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. 'International norm dynamics and political change,' *International organization* 52(04): 887-917.

Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert. 1993. 'Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework.' In: Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert, eds. Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 3-30.

Hofferberth, Matthias, and Christian Weber. 2015. 'Lost in translation: a critique of constructivist norm research'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 18(1): 75-103.